



UNSC

United Nations Security Council

Official Study Guide



AGENDA

Addressing the regional and global security implications due to non state actors in the Indian subcontinent with a special emphasis on the cross border instability along the Durand Line.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1 Letter from the Executive Board**
- 2 Introduction to the Committee**
- 3 List of Key Terms**
- 4 Introduction to the Agenda**
- 5 Timeline**
- 6 Case Studies**
- 7 Bloc Positions**
- 8 Past Resolutions by the UN**
- 9 Questions A Resolution Must Answer**
- 10 Sources to Use**
- 11 Preambulatory and Operative Clauses**

Letter from the EB

Dear Delegates,

We welcome you to the United Nations Security Council at The JBCN Oshiwara MUN 2026. On behalf of ourselves and the Secretariat we would like to warmly extend our greetings and wish to moderate fruitful debate and diplomacy.

In this edition of the JBCN Oshiwara MUN, the United Nations Security Council's agenda will be: Addressing the regional and global security implications due to non state actors in the Indian subcontinent with a special emphasis on the cross border instability along the Durand Line. This agenda is of particular significance as it has pertained to the absolutist governance of countless states leading to stalled development and r foreign policy, which has acute ramifications of surrounding nations.

Please be informed that the purpose of this study guide is to seed your research. However, it will be essential for you to undertake extensive independent research, beyond this guide, in order to develop a nuanced understanding of the agenda, its implications on various nations, and their subsequent foreign policies, alongside the actions undertaken in the past and present toward both escalation and resolve. Furthermore, the increasing multipolarity of the world has accentuated the significance of the agenda and the severity of its consequences which, in turn, necessitates a robust interpretation of the geopolitical dynamics at play in order to evaluate and debate conflicting perspectives.

The Executive Board and Organising Committee are wholly committed to ensuring that you have an enriching and fulfilling experience over the conference weekend. For this, we implore you to actively participate in the committee, as this will optimise your learning while rendering the debate and diplomacy conducted in committee fruitful and impactful.

We are earnestly looking forward to seeing you at the fourth edition of the JBCN Oshiwara MUN. We seek to facilitate constructive debate which will then be foundational to meaningful resolutions. Should you require any assistance at any point, do not hesitate to reach out to us. Whether this is your first MUN or one of many we are thrilled to have you join us.

If you are new to the process we are excited to welcome you to the dynamic world of debate and diplomacy. If you are returning we are impatient to witness the energy and insight you will bring to committee. Either way, we are enthusiastically anticipating a spirited committee carved by rigour and research.

Warm Regards,

Naqash Chamadia
Director

Vivan Mahesh
Assistant Director

Avya Rana
Moderator

Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established in 1945 as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations under the UN Charter. The Council is entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it is tasked with responding to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. It is composed of fifteen members. Five of these, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are permanent members and hold the power of veto, while the remaining ten are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms on the basis of regional representation. A procedural decision requires nine affirmative votes, while a substantive decision requires nine affirmative votes including the concurring votes of all five permanent members, meaning that any one of them may block a resolution.

Unlike the resolutions of the General Assembly and its committees, the resolutions of the Security Council are binding on all 193 member states, which under Article 25 of the Charter agree to accept and carry out its decisions. The Council may impose economic sanctions and arms embargoes, establish and mandate peacekeeping operations, refer situations to the International Criminal Court, recommend the admission of new members and the appointment of the Secretary-General, and authorise the use of force as a last resort. It works in close cooperation with its subsidiary bodies, including the various sanctions committees and the Military Staff Committee, and with regional organisations acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The mandate of the Security Council is derived from Articles 24, 25, and 26 of the UN Charter, together with the powers set out in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII.

The Council is led by a presidency that rotates monthly among its members in English alphabetical order. Its work on any given matter is generally structured into three stages:

1. Briefings and consultations
2. Negotiation of draft resolutions
3. Formal meetings and voting (action on drafts)

List of Key Terms

The Durand Line agreement:

The establishment of the 2,640km international border between the Emirate of Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire in 1893 signed by Sir Mortimer Durand and Emir Abdur Rahman Khan.

The Pashtun division:

The Duran line cuts through the Pashtun and Baloch tribal lands, dividing both ethnic groups.

Pashtunistan:

A historical and geographical region on the cross roads of South and Central Asia inhabited by the Pashtun people.

Uti Possidetis Juris Doctrine:

The customary international law under which the Durand Line is internationally recognized as Pakistan's western frontier with Afghanistan.

Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties:

Dictates that the Durand line remains a valid international border.

Anti-Terrorism Act (1997):

A legal framework in Pakistan for counter terrorism that criminalizes acts of terrorism and sectarian violence.

Local Intelligence Based Organizations:

Conducted by the Pakistan Army and security forces as an attempt to neutralize the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The Anglo-Afghan pact (1905):

This Treaty reaffirmed the validity of the border.

The Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919):

After the Third Anglo-Afghan War, this Treaty was formed to end hostilities and officially recognize the Durand line as its international frontier.

The Treaty of Kabul (1921):

Formally amended the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919) and required Afghanistan to reaffirm the Durand Line.

The Golden Crescent:

An illicit opium producing region trailing from Iran to Pakistan which is intersected by the Durand Line.

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC):

Refers to the exploitation of technology and globalization to generate profit as a business across national borders.

Operation Ghazab Lil Haq (2026):

A major military attack against the Afghan Taliban across the Durand Line operated by Pakistan as a declaration of open war.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA):

A mission that focuses on the documentation of civilian casualties and advocating for protection for citizens during cross border attacks.

Afghanistan-Pakistan border barrier:

Initiated by Pakistan in 2017 to fence the border with steel and razor wire fortification.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373:

States that countries and states are to refrain from providing any support to persons involved in terrorist acts and are allowed to deny safe havens to anyone planning to finance or commit terrorist acts.

Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K):

It is an active regional affiliate of the Islamic State operating in South and Central Asia.

Gulan Camp (Khost Province):

A refugee camp located approximately 10km from the Pakistani border and houses thousands of Pakistani-Pashtun families.

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI):

The premier intelligence agency located in Pakistan managing cross border security and countering Pashtun individuals or militant groups.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):

An infrastructure and development project linking China's Xinjiang region to Pakistan's Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea

The Afghanistan Minister of Defense:

The department of Afghanistan responsible for overseeing Afghan Armed Forces.

Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS):

A bilateral institutional framework finalized by Kabul and Islamabad in 2018 operating through six dedicated joint working groups.

Introduction to the agenda

The agenda “Addressing the regional and global security implications due to non-state actors in the Indian subcontinent with a special emphasis on the cross border instability along the Durand Line” is of great importance to the United Nations Security Council. This is because the region is an epicenter for global terrorism where stalled development and restricted opportunities have pertained to ideological extremism due to the nature of LEDCs which are susceptible to ethnic and national radicalism.

This trend in the subcontinent is a direct outcome of the extractive and regressive control and intervention by foreign powers. Politics in the region continue to oscillate between puppet governments and absolutist regimes which leverage fanatic ideology to maintain power. This instability in governance pertains to perpetual civil strife and a lack of accountability, contributing to the rogue diplomacy which engenders regional and global hostility.

Several states in the region have relied on non-state actors’ brute strategies as an instrument of diplomacy. This state sanctioned projection of illegitimate violence, which breaches international treaties such as the Geneva Protocol, continues to plague individuals and politics, both domestic and international.

The malign allocation of state resources stagnates domestic prosperity and accentuates regional derangement, while hostile diplomacy, awry from international collaboration, poses threats to global sanctity. However, despite multilateral efforts for resolve, the heretic discord of these states with international governance and forums impedes efforts toward reconciliation and reconstruction. These states are often neither impacted by deterrence nor destruction, thereby rendering the international efforts obsolete in rectifying ongoing crises and threats.

Thus, it remains a central objective of the Security Council’s efforts to counterpoise nonconformity by states to international cooperation and weave them into international bodies to foster peaceful coexistence in the region.

History of the Agenda and Timeline

Origins

The Durand Line Agreement of 1893 was signed by British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand and Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan. The Agreement intended to create a buffer for the British Indian colony against the Russian Empire, amidst the “Great Game”; the imperial race in Asia.

In doing so, the Line arbitrarily divided the Pashun and Baloch populace. Although attributed to cultural disregard, the division was largely intentional. British strategists prioritised geographical control of elevated terrain to create the “Scientific Frontier”, while also ensuring that the region remained volatile and resistance remained fragmented. Thus, military advantage overrode ethnic cohesion, contributing to persistent instability in the region.

While British accounts recall cordial negotiations, it is evident that the Agreement was an outcome of both hostile diplomacy and economic manipulation. The British both overpowered the Emir’s army and increased his annual dole by 50% to compel him into signing the instrument which was counterproductive for Central Asian culture and ethnicity. Thus, since the Emir, no Afghan government including the Taliban has formally recognised the Durand Line. Similar sentiments have been reciprocated by Pakistani factions segmented by the Line.

Consequent to ethnic derangement, the establishment of the division fundamentally underscores the rise of terrorism in the subcontinent in the 20th century. Although there were other factors that contributed to exacerbating hostility, such as the Radcliffe Line, socioeconomic conditions in the Subcontinent, political turbulence and expansionary foreign policy, underlying tensions were largely rooted in the institution of the Line.

The rise in non state actor groups

The grievances of groups disgruntled by agreements including but not limited to the Durand Line pertained directly to extremism. This was primarily channelled after the decolonization of the Subcontinent, as independent states fostered rogue militia; as an outcome of a lack of state control or, particularly in coming decades, state sponsorship and support.

Establishing the Radcliffe Line, which had similar consequences to the Durand Line, directly deposited into existing radicalism. Particularly, the post independence 1947 Kashmir War saw the deployment of rogue militia for territorial fortification while sustaining complete state deniability.

Parallely, apropos to the decline in British influence in the region, the Afghan regime undertook solidarity to the Durand Line. Subsequently, after brief military engagements and cross border aerial warfare along the Durand Line, the Agreement's nullification was ratified by the Loya Jirga, signifying the state level refusal of the presumed International Boundary up to 1949.

Moving into the 1950s, NSAGs persisted in the region, however, they operated at a small scale. With sparse funding and outdated technology, they relied solely on their rhetoric projected toward marginalised populations to sustain their cause.

While the Durand Line was temporarily stable, the Radcliffe Line facilitated expounding derangement in East Pakistan. This was made imminent by the Mukti Bahini movement. Specifically, the arbitrary and consequently unsustainable unification of Bengali Muslims with Pakistan led to persistent discontent. Similar to NSAGs along the Durand Line, East Pakistani resistance relied on attritious resistance while also engaging the advocacy and dialogue to advance their cause. While this caused alarm in West Pakistan, the election of the Awami League with a majority in the Parliament dealt a detrimental damage to the incumbent government. This meant that an East Pakistani minority party would control both factions of Pakistan (as they were united at the time). Thus, in an attempt to salvage power, the existing government launched Operation Searchlight. This involved a violent crackdown on the Movement using both state sponsored and non state resources. The Operation killed over 3 million East Pakistanis through mass executions, carpet bombings, torture and scorched Earth campaigns. The crackdown resulted in the separation of Pakistan and Bangladesh as a consequence of The Bangladesh Liberation War, it nonetheless depicts how NSAGs can destabilise regions in the process of fighting for ethnic or cultural rights.

Implications of the Cold War

The Indian Subcontinent has historically been a region where Eastern and Western powers and interests collide, as has been observed since the “Great Game” and the subsequent Agreement. The inception of the Cold War marked a revival of imperialism in the form of indirect rather than direct sociopolitical influence. This spilled over into the Subcontinent as the weakening Soviet economic and political control in Europe prompted expansion into Asia. The nature of the Cold War prompted multilateral intervention, however, in a bid to avert attritious involvement, the USA undertook the path of indirect influence; establishing and funding the Mujahideen.

While this successfully prevented the takeover of Afghanistan and concluded The Soviet Afghan War after a decade of conflict, the means of victory destabilised the region. Funded and trained by the American forces, the mujahideen exhibiting rogue behaviour in coming years. This fundamentally underlined the formation of militia and extremists including the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, rogue militarism was redirected rather than ceased. The mujahideen spread into Pakistan and supported the formation of other similar groups, such as the Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Muhhamed. Although the emergence of cross border extremism was initially left distraught without American support, under the military leadership of General Zia Ul Haq it was institutionalised and supported by state.

This revival of non state actors had severe implications on regional stability. Imminently, while insurgency in the disputed Indo Pakistan IB amplified, the deployment of official military assets under the disguise of radicalists during the Kargil War 1999 caused particular trepidation of the consequences of complete deniability for states sponsoring non state actors. It was made evident that in a region or time of tension, short of conflict, there can be escalation in which the obfuscated distinction of state military and outlawful extremists permits the use of force as an instrument of diplomacy without accountability.

Cross border hostility along the Durand Line and its consequences

Implications of non state actors on the rest of the Indian Subcontinent

5.1 The Sri Lankan Civil War

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam emerged in the 1980s seeking to create a sovereign Tamil state comprising regions in Northwestern Sri Lanka and Southern India. They pivoted on maritime control and deployed fishing assets as military vessels. Carrying out mass attacks and bombings including the infamous assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE terrorised the Subcontinent until its defeat. Although their influence and detriment peaked before the 2000s, they continued in an attempt to rebuild until the Sri Lanka military crackdown in 2009.

5.2 Instances of violence against civilians

5.2.1 The Akshardham Temple Attack

On 24 September 2002, two armed Fedayeen attacked the Swaminarayan Akshardham temple complex in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, killing over 30 people and wounding 80. The siege ended after a National Security Guard commando operation in which both attackers were killed.

Global ramifications of extremism stemming from the Region

6.1 9/11 and the global war on terror

The September 11 attacks in the United States were the largest aviation disaster in history. They permanently transformed the Durand Line from a former buffer to a heavily militarized zone. They directly contributed to Pakistan fortifying the border and intervening in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which disrupted local Pashtun tribes catalysing regional displacement which exacerbated existing discontent.

The build up to these outcomes was consequent of the following:

- Two undercover al-Qaeda operatives killed the military commander of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance Ahmed Shah Massoud , on September 9th, 2001.

After the Taliban refused to surrender Osama bin Laden. Subsequently, a United States-led coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001.

The Bonn Agreement, the fall of Kandahar, and Tora Bora:

- The Operation intended to extract the orchestrators of the attack. On December 5, 2001, Afghan anti government factions and the U.S. signed an agreement in Bonn. This was intended to facilitate a transition into the post Taliban period in Afghanistan, effectively ousting the incumbent government. Thus, the signatories established an interim administration under Hamid Karzai, endorsed by Security Council Resolution 1383.
- The Council authorised the formation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on December 20. During the same weeks, coalition and Afghan forces fought al-Qaeda fighters entrenched in the cave complex at Tora Bora in the White Mountains near the Pakistani border. This forced Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Taliban leadership to relocate to the area around Quetta in Balochistan.

Subsequently, American and Afghan forces, joined by special operations troops from several coalition countries, launched Operation Anaconda against an estimated eight hundred al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the Shah-i-Kot Valley of Paktia province.

Local bombings led by militant groups in Central Asia.

8.1 The Mumbai twin car bombings August 25, 2003:

- Two car bombs exploded almost simultaneously near the Gateway of India and in the Zaveri Bazaar jewellery market in Mumbai, killing at least fifty-two people and injuring around one hundred and fifty. The bombings were linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives working with local accomplices.

8.2 Dhemaji School bombing August 15, 2004:

- ULFA detonated a bomb at an Independence Day function being held on school grounds in Dhemaji, Assam, killing around eighteen people, most of them school children and their mothers.

8.3 Delhi serial bombings October 29, 2005:

- Three explosions struck crowded markets and a bus in New Delhi two days before the festival of Diwali, killing around sixty-two people and injuring more than two hundred. The attack was attributed to Pakistan-based groups operating in coordination with local networks and was among the deadliest in the capital during this period.

8.4 Varanasi bombings March 7, 2006:

- A series of explosions struck the Sankat Mochan temple and the Cantonment railway station in the Hindu pilgrimage city of Varanasi, killing around twenty-eight people.

8.5 Mumbai train bombings July 11, 2006:

- Seven coordinated explosions tore through first-class compartments of the Mumbai suburban rail network during the evening rush hour, over a span of roughly eleven minutes. The bombs, concealed in pressure cookers placed in luggage, killed one hundred and eighty-nine people and injured more than eight hundred. Investigators attributed the attack to Lashkar-e-Taiba operating with the Students Islamic Movement of India, though responsibility was also later associated with the emerging Indian Mujahideen network.

8.6 Samjhauta Express bombings February 18, 2007:

- Twin blasts and the fire that followed destroyed two carriages of the Samjhauta Express, the cross-border train service linking Delhi with Lahore, near Panipat. Sixty-eight people were killed, most of them being Pakistani civilians travelling home.

8.7 Jaipur bombings May 13, 2008:

A series of coordinated explosions struck markets and areas near temples in the city of Jaipur, killing around sixty-three people and injuring some one hundred and fifty. The Indian Mujahideen, a domestic network drawing on former members of the Students Islamic Movement of India, claimed responsibility through an email. The attack opened a year in which this network would strike repeatedly across Indian cities.

July-December 2003 - Clashes over encroachment, Operation All Clear Bhutan:

- Afghan and Pakistani forces clashed over border posts when Afghanistan alleged that the Pakistani military had established positions inside Afghan territory in the Yaqubi area near Mohmand.
- Two car bombs exploded almost simultaneously near the Gateway of India and in the Zaveri Bazaar jewellery market in Mumbai, killing at least fifty-two people and injuring around one hundred and fifty. The bombings were linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives working with local accomplices.
- Assamese and Bodo separatist groups, principally the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), along with the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, had operated training camps in the dense forests of southern Bhutan, using them to launch attacks into the Indian state of Assam.
- After years of failed negotiations, the Royal Bhutan Army launched Operation All Clear on December 15, 2003, its first military operation in well over a century.

By early January the camps had been destroyed and several hundred insurgents killed, captured, or driven across the border.

August-September, 2004 - the first Afghan president election, formation of the CPI (Maoist) :

- First direct Afghan presidential election: Afghanistan held its first direct presidential election, in which Hamid Karzai was elected to lead the new government established under the post-Bonn constitution.
- The two largest Maoist organisations in India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War, known as the People's War Group, and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, merged on September 21, 2004, to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

June-October 2005-2007 - Salwa Judum and the militarisation of Bastar, the first fencing and mining proposals:

- The government of Chhattisgarh sponsored an anti-Maoist movement called Salwa Judum, drawing local tribal youth into an armed vigilante force, many of them appointed as Special Police Officers. The movement would later be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2011.
- The first fencing and mining proposals: Pakistan first proposed fencing and mining the border in 2005 and 2006 as a means of stopping militant infiltration, drawing immediate objections from Kabul, which argued that any unilateral barrier would divide the Pashtun tribes and make the contested line permanent. In 2007 Pakistan erected fencing and posts near the border-straddling bazaar of Angoor Ada in South Waziristan, prompting the Afghan army to remove them and exchange artillery fire. The early projects were largely abandoned for lack of funds, but they established fencing as a central flashpoint of the dispute.

July 3 to 11, 2007 - The siege of Lal Masjid: In Islamabad, militants associated with the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and its affiliated seminaries confronted the Pakistani state, demanding the imposition of strict Islamic law. After negotiations failed, Pakistani security forces stormed the complex in an operation that left more than a hundred people dead. The siege marked a decisive rupture between the Pakistani state and the militant networks in the tribal areas, prompting a wave of retaliatory attacks and accelerating the consolidation of a domestic Pakistani insurgency directed against the government itself.

December 14, 2007: The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was officially formed with approximately 40 senior Taliban leaders and 13 to 27 militant factions united in South Waziristan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) to unite militant factions under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.

May 13, 2008 - Jaipur bombings: A series of coordinated explosions struck markets and areas near temples in the city of Jaipur, killing around sixty-three people and injuring some one hundred and fifty. The Indian Mujahideen, a domestic network drawing on former members of the Students Islamic Movement of India, claimed responsibility through an email. The attack opened a year in which this network would strike repeatedly across Indian cities.

July 25 and 26, 2008 - Bangalore and Ahmedabad bombings: On July 25, a series of low-intensity blasts struck Bangalore, killing two people. The following day, a far larger wave of around twenty explosions hit Ahmedabad in Gujarat, killing approximately fifty-six people and injuring many more. Devices were also reportedly planted to target hospitals where victims would be taken. The Indian Mujahideen claimed both attacks, again by email, signalling a shift toward serial, multi-city bombing campaigns mounted by an indigenous network.

September 13, 2008 - Delhi serial bombings and the Batla House encounter: Five bombs exploded in markets across New Delhi, killing around thirty people and injuring over a hundred. The Indian Mujahideen claimed responsibility. Six days later, on September 19, Delhi police raided a flat in the Batla House area, where two suspected members of the network were killed along with a police inspector, Mohan Chand Sharma. The encounter became one of the most disputed counter-terrorism operations of the period.

October 30, 2008 - Assam serial bombings: A series of coordinated explosions struck Guwahati and other towns across Assam, killing more than eighty people and injuring several hundred in one of the deadliest single days of violence in the Northeast. Investigators attributed the attack to a faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. The bombings demonstrated that, even as some insurgent groups weakened, ethnic militancy in the Northeast retained the capacity for mass-casualty attacks.

November 26 to 29, 2008 - The Mumbai attacks (26/11): Ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, having travelled by sea from Karachi and hijacked an Indian fishing trawler en route, came ashore in Mumbai on the evening of November 26 and launched coordinated assaults on the Chhatrapati Shivaji railway terminus, two luxury hotels, a Jewish centre, a café, and other sites. The sieges lasted roughly sixty hours and were broadcast live. One hundred and sixty-six people were killed, including foreign nationals and security personnel, and more than three hundred were injured. Nine of the attackers were killed and one, Ajmal Kasab, was captured alive; his interrogation and later trial confirmed that the operation had been planned, financed, and directed from Pakistan. The attacks derailed a fragile India-Pakistan peace process and raised fears of war between the two states, fears that were contained when India chose a diplomatic rather than a military response.

2009 - Operation Green Hunt and the proscription of the Maoists: In 2009 the Indian government launched a sustained, coordinated counter-insurgency effort against the Maoists, popularly referred to as Operation Green Hunt, involving the planned deployment of tens of thousands of central paramilitary forces alongside state police. On June 22, 2009, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formally banned as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The same year saw the Lalgarh uprising in West Bengal, where a tribal protest movement was taken over by Maoist cadres before being cleared by security forces. The escalation provoked some of the deadliest Maoist counter-attacks in the following year.

April 10, 2009 and onward - Emergence of the Arakan Army: In April 2009, ethnic Rakhine fighters formed the Arakan Army in Myanmar's Kachin State, initially trained by the Kachin Independence Army, with the stated aim of greater autonomy for the Rakhine people of the western coastal region historically known as Arakan. Though it would become militarily significant only later in the decade, its formation added a new armed actor to a region already marked by deep ethnic and religious division, on a frontier abutting India's Northeast and Bangladesh.

August to October 2009 - The Pakistani state strikes back in Waziristan: On August 5, 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, the founder of the TTP, was killed in an American drone strike in South Waziristan, and was succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud. In October the Pakistani Army launched a major ground offensive into South Waziristan, Operation Rah-e-Nijat, against the TTP heartland, part of a series of campaigns through which the state sought to reclaim the tribal areas. The offensives were accompanied by an intensifying campaign of American drone strikes across the border region.

December 2009 - Collapse of ULFA's external leadership: In December 2009, the chairman of ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa, along with other senior leaders, was handed over to India by Bangladeshi authorities following a crackdown on Indian insurgent sanctuaries there. The loss of the group's external command, combined with the earlier loss of bases in Bhutan, marked the steep decline of ULFA as a fighting force and opened the path to peace negotiations with the pro-talks faction in the years that followed, while a hardline faction under Paresh Baruah continued to operate from across the border.

February 13, 2010 - Pune German Bakery bombing: A bomb concealed in a bag exploded at the German Bakery in Pune, a venue popular with foreigners, killing seventeen people and injuring around sixty. The attack was attributed to the Indian Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba networks and ended a relative lull in urban bombings inside India.

April 6, 2010 - Dantewada ambush: In the forests of Dantewada district in Chhattisgarh, around a thousand Maoist cadres ambushed a company of the Central Reserve Police Force returning from an operation, killing seventy-six personnel in a sustained firefight. It was the single deadliest attack on security forces in the history of the insurgency and exposed serious gaps in coordination between central paramilitary forces and state police.

May 2010 - Maoist attacks on civilians and infrastructure: On May 17, 2010, a Maoist landmine destroyed a bus in Dantewada, killing around forty-four people, including Special Police Officers and civilians. On May 28, the Jnaneswari Express was derailed near Jhargram in West Bengal after its tracks were sabotaged, and the resulting collision with an oncoming train killed roughly one hundred and fifty passengers. The attack was attributed to a Maoist-linked organisation, and together these incidents marked the peak lethality of the insurgency, with a sharp rise in civilian deaths.

May 2, 2011 - Killing of Osama bin Laden: A United States Navy SEAL team conducted a helicopter-borne raid, codenamed Operation Neptune Spear, on a walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, killing Osama bin Laden. He had been living for several years in a city that also hosted Pakistan's principal military academy, roughly thirty miles from Islamabad. The raid was carried out without prior notification to Pakistan, severely straining relations between the two governments and intensifying suspicion within the United States about the extent of official Pakistani knowledge of bin Laden's presence. The killing removed al-Qaeda's founder but did little to slow the insurgencies that had taken root across the region

July 5, 2011 - Salwa Judum declared unconstitutional: The Supreme Court of India ruled that the Salwa Judum militia and the arming of tribal youth as Special Police Officers were illegal and unconstitutional, ordering the force disbanded and its weapons recovered. The judgment was a landmark in the legal scrutiny of state counter-insurgency methods, though its implementation on the ground in Chhattisgarh remained incomplete.

July 13, 2011 - Mumbai triple bombings: Three coordinated explosions struck the Opera House, Zaveri Bazaar, and Dadar areas of Mumbai during the evening, killing around twenty-six people and injuring more than one hundred and thirty. The Indian Mujahideen was held responsible, demonstrating the network's continued capacity to strike India's commercial capital despite the security overhaul that had followed the 2008 attacks.

September 7, 2011 - Delhi High Court bombing: A bomb left in a briefcase at a public entrance to the Delhi High Court killed around fifteen people and injured many more. The attack, claimed in the name of a militant network linked to groups based in Pakistan and Bangladesh, was among the last major urban bombings of this phase before the wave of Indian Mujahideen attacks began to subside.

November 26, 2011 - The Salala incident: A NATO airstrike struck Pakistani military posts at Salala, in the Mohmand frontier area, killing twenty-four Pakistani soldiers. The incident, occurring directly on the contested frontier, triggered a severe rupture in relations between Pakistan and the United States, including the closure of NATO supply routes through Pakistan for months. It underscored how the ambiguity and militarisation of the line could produce major crises beyond the two principal parties.

June and October 2012 - The Rakhine State riots: Communal violence erupted in Myanmar's Rakhine State in June 2012 between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya communities, following the reported rape and murder of a Rakhine woman and the killing of Muslim travellers in reprisal. A state of emergency was declared and the military took over administration of the region. A second wave of violence followed in October. Across the year the riots left around two hundred people dead and displaced roughly one hundred and forty thousand, the overwhelming majority of them Rohingya, who were confined to internment camps and denied freedom of movement. The Rohingya, classified by Myanmar as illegal immigrants and denied citizenship since 1982, fled in growing numbers by sea and across the border into Bangladesh. The violence laid the groundwork for the formation of a Rohingya insurgent group, Harakah al-Yaqin, later renamed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, founded in 2013 in direct response to the riots.

November 21, 2012 - Execution of Ajmal Kasab: Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving attacker from the 2008 Mumbai attacks, was hanged at Yerwada jail in Pune after the Supreme Court upheld his conviction for murder and waging war against India. His capture and testimony had provided the most direct evidence of Pakistani planning and direction of the attack.

February 9, 2013 - Execution of Afzal Guru: Afzal Guru, convicted for his role in the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, was hanged at Tihar jail in Delhi. The execution carried significant political resonance, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, and was followed by heightened security alerts.

February 21, 2013 - Hyderabad twin bombings: Two bombs placed on bicycles exploded near a bus stand and a cinema in the crowded Dilsukhnagar area of Hyderabad, killing around eighteen people and injuring more than a hundred. The Indian Mujahideen was held responsible. It was one of the last major attacks attributed to the network before the arrest of several of its leaders.

May 25, 2013 - Darbha Valley ambush: Maoist cadres ambushed a convoy of Indian National Congress leaders in the Darbha Valley of Bastar district, Chhattisgarh, in an attack also referred to by the location Jhiram Ghati. Around twenty-seven people were killed, including senior state Congress figures. The attack was notable for striking directly at the political leadership of a major party, rather than at security forces or government infrastructure, and underscored the persistence of the insurgency despite years of counter-operations.

July 7, 2013 - Bodh Gaya bombings: A series of low-intensity explosions struck the Mahabodhi temple complex at Bodh Gaya in Bihar, one of the most important sites in Buddhism. Casualties were limited, but the targeting of a major religious and heritage site drew international attention. The Indian Mujahideen was held responsible, and the choice of target was linked to militant rhetoric concerning the violence against Muslims in Myanmar.

October 27, 2013 - Patna serial bombings: A series of bombs exploded in and around a large political rally being addressed by Narendra Modi in Patna, Bihar, killing around six people and injuring some eighty-five. The attack, attributed to the Indian Mujahideen, demonstrated the network's intent to strike high-profile political events and came amid a wave of arrests that would substantially degrade its operational capacity in the years immediately following.

2014 - Transition in Afghanistan: By the end of 2013 the United States and its NATO partners were preparing to wind down combat operations in Afghanistan, with most international forces scheduled to withdraw and security responsibility transferred to Afghan forces under what became Operation Resolute Support. The conventional Western combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, formally ended in December 2014. The insurgencies it had been launched to address, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan's tribal belt, and across the wider subcontinent, remained unresolved, leaving the region's interlocking conflicts substantially intact at the close of the period covered by this timeline

June 15, 2014: The Pakistan Armed Forces conducted a joint military offensive with several Pakistan militant groups named Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Sharp and Cutting Strike) launched in North Waziristan. The heavy flow of war militants forced Pakistan to take a stricter stance on territorial sovereignty.

December 16-28, 2014: The formal end of the 13 year combat mission conducted by the U.S and NATO after successfully training Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) and proceeded to a supportive role instead. The reduction in support in Afghanistan led to a surge in the Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) capitalizing on the diluted Afghan Forces and launching attacks. TTP militants launched an intense attack on the APS Peshawar School located in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This led to a massacre of around 140 individuals, mainly including children.

June 2016 - The Torkham gate clashes: Fighting broke out at the Torkham crossing, the principal gateway on the Khyber Pass route, when Pakistan began constructing a gate and other installations at the boundary. Several people were killed, including a Pakistani officer, and the crossing was repeatedly closed. In the same period Pakistan completed a trench of roughly 1,100 kilometres along the Balochistan portion of the border to restrict movement. The Torkham confrontation made clear that Pakistani efforts to harden the line at its busiest points would be met with force.

October 9, 2016: The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) perpetrated a systematic campaign of mass killings, sexual violence, and forced dislocation of Rohingya Muslims minority known as the Rohingya Genocide. The displacement of Rohingya peoples created the world's largest refugee camp in Bangladesh. The genocide was committed to eradicate Rohingya Muslims considering them as dangerous because of Burma being a dominant Buddhist state. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) claims to protect Rohingya Muslims that were affected in the genocide but their catastrophic attacks triggered the military crackdown, burning Rohingya villages and forcing Rohingya civilians into becoming stateless refugees.

March 26-April 17, 2017: The fencing programme begins in earnest: The Pakistani army announced the start of a comprehensive fencing of the Durand Line, beginning in the high-threat Bajaur and Mohmand areas. The barrier consisted of a pair of fences several metres high, topped with razor wire, accompanied by hundreds of new forts and border posts and an extensive surveillance system, at a projected cost of more than half a billion dollars. Pakistan presented the fence as a measure against militant infiltration and smuggling. Afghanistan condemned it as a unilateral act intended to convert a disputed line into a permanent border and to divide the Pashtun and Baloch peoples. In 2017 former president Karzai re-stated that Afghanistan would never recognise the line.

2018 - The merger of the tribal areas: Pakistan formally merged the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, ending the separate administrative status the tribal belt had retained since the colonial period. The merger was intended to extend the writ of the state into the borderland, though the region remained a contested space in which militant networks persisted and the dispute over the line's legitimacy continued to complicate governance.

December 6, 2018: Pakistan expanded the wire fortification project and introduced the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) which was agreed on by a meeting in Kabul with the former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and former Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi with mediation from China. The action plan was established to manage regional division issues and provide more security to the border.

2018-2019: Pakistan continued to straighten the border aggressively which was argued with resistance from the Afghan government due to the difference in what each state envisioned, leading to a major dispute. Pakistan continued to fortify the border despite Afghanistan's disapproval, causing an increase in tensions on both sides.

February 29, 2020: The United States and the Taliban signed an agreement to bring peace in Afghanistan known as the Doha agreement. The agreement led to an increase in militarization in South Asia which was followed by a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey which was later protested upon due to the Durand Line being mentioned as a border by Qatar which Afghanistan protested against.

September 12, 2020: Afghanistan conducted Intra-Afghan direct peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Doha in an aim to establish a permanent ceasefire and end the 19 years of attacks and hostility. The Taliban and Afghanistan continued to view the border as an imaginary line and protested against Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs from mentioning it as an international foreign border.

August 15, 2021: The Taliban return and reject the line again: The Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021 as the United States completed its withdrawal. Despite Pakistan's long association with the movement, the new administration maintained the historic Afghan refusal to recognise the Durand Line, with senior officials stating publicly that Afghanistan had never accepted it and never would. In December 2021 Taliban forces physically disrupted Pakistani fencing work in Nangarhar province, with the Afghan defence ministry describing the fence as illegal. The change of government in Kabul had not changed Afghanistan's position, and it set the stage for direct confrontation between two states that had once been close. At the same time the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban, intensified its insurgency against Pakistan from sanctuaries on the Afghan side.

Late 2022 - Renewed clashes at the southern crossings: Fighting recurred at the Chaman and Spin Boldak crossing in Balochistan and southern Kandahar, with exchanges of small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire in November and December 2022 that killed border guards and civilians and led to repeated indefinite closures of the crossing. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ended its ceasefire with Islamabad in late 2022 and stepped up attacks from across the line, beginning the sharp deterioration that would follow.

2023 - Border closures and the mass expulsion of Afghans: A clash at the Torkham crossing closed it again in February 2023. Later in the year Pakistan launched a mass expulsion campaign against Afghan nationals, framed as a counterterrorism measure, ordering the departure of those without legal status. The deportation drive turned the several million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of them Pashtun, into instruments of the wider dispute, and it became a major new source of friction along the frontier.

October 3, 2023: The Pakistani government ordered a mass deportation of 1.73 million undocumented Afghan nationals to leave the region before November 1, 2023 or face consequences of mass deportation and detention, forcing several Afghan nationalists to return to Afghanistan. The deportation was issued due to Pakistan's safety concerns after a rise of militant attacks and illicit economic activity. The policy also impacted vulnerable at-risk groups, including former civil servants, journalists, and women's rights advocates that were fleeing the Taliban.

March 2024 - Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan: After a Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan attack on Pakistani forces, Pakistan conducted airstrikes inside Afghan territory in Khost and Paktika provinces, marking an escalation from border skirmishing to strikes across the line. Islamabad asserted that the TTP operated freely from Afghan soil and that Kabul was unwilling to act against it, while the Taliban condemned the strikes as violations of Afghan sovereignty. Pakistani officials later attributed more than two thousand five hundred deaths in Pakistan during 2024 to militancy directed from across the border.

October 2025 - The largest conflict since the Taliban takeover: Beginning on October 9, 2025, fighting escalated sharply. Pakistan carried out airstrikes reportedly targeting the TTP and its leadership, including in Kabul and several eastern provinces. The Taliban retaliated on October 11 and 12 with attacks on Pakistani military posts along the Durand Line, and heavy fighting followed around Spin Boldak, where civilians were killed. Pakistan struck targets in Kabul and Kandahar, and the principal crossings, including Torkham and Chaman, were closed. It was the largest confrontation between the two states since 2021. After mediation by Qatar and Turkey, the two governments agreed to a ceasefire on October 19, under which Kabul pledged to prevent militant activity against Pakistan and both sides agreed not to target each other's forces, civilians, or infrastructure. According to the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, at least seventy civilians were killed and several hundred injured in Afghanistan between October and December 2025.

November 2025 - Collapse of the talks: The ceasefire proved fragile. On November 7 a clash at the Chaman and Spin Boldak crossing killed several people on the Afghan side even as negotiations continued in Istanbul, and those talks subsequently deadlocked. A suicide bombing in Islamabad later in the month, which Pakistan attributed to Afghan nationals, hardened positions further. By the end of 2025 the mediation effort had dissolved, more than a million Afghans had been deported during the year, and the border had remained largely closed since October, with only deported Afghans permitted to cross.

February 2026 - Open war and Operation Ghazab Lil Haq: On February 21 and 22, 2026, Pakistan conducted airstrikes on alleged TTP and Islamic State Khorasan camps in eastern Afghanistan. Afghan forces fired into northwestern Pakistan on February 26, and the Taliban announced large-scale offensive operations against Pakistani positions along the Durand Line. Pakistan launched a cross-border military campaign it named Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, and its defence minister described the situation as one of open war, the first time Islamabad had struck Afghan urban areas. China, Qatar, Russia, and Saudi Arabia offered to mediate, and India condemned the Pakistani strikes. On February 27, 2026 the Pakistan Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif declared an open war called Operation Ghazab Lil Haq (Operation Righteous Fury). The conflict quickly expanded beyond the border with Pakistan conducting retaliatory airstrikes on major Afghan political centers including Kabul and Kandahar.

Mid-2026 - The current state of the dispute: As of mid-2026 the Durand Line remains an active military front rather than a managed boundary. The principal crossings have stayed largely closed since late 2025, prompting Afghanistan to begin rerouting its trade away from Pakistani ports toward Iran and Central Asia and weakening one of Pakistan's traditional sources of leverage over its landlocked neighbour. The core of the dispute is unchanged from 1893: Pakistan holds the line to be a settled international border, the Taliban administration in Kabul refuses to recognise it, and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan continues to use the contested frontier as a base from which to strike Pakistan. The combination of an unrecognised boundary, a near-complete but contested fence, displaced populations, and entrenched militant networks has left the Durand Line one of the most volatile borders in the world, with the underlying question of its legitimacy no closer to resolution than when the line was first drawn.

Case Study

Durand Agreement (1893): An agreement signed between the Emirate of Afghan and British India by Sir Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat and member of the Indian Civil Service, and Emir Abdur Rahman Khan. It was initially established to prevent the control of British India by the Russian Empire after the British-Russian Great Game Rivalry which was a rivalry between the two empires for domination and influence in Central Asia. The Durand Agreement created a neutral buffer region which defined the spheres of influence to ensure the two empires did not directly border each other. It provided the British with control over major trade and military routes, mainly including the Khyber Pass.

Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905): A treaty formed to reaffirm the commitments made between Afghanistan and British India after the death of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan. It was signed by Amir Habibullah Khan who succeeded his father Emir Abdur Rahman Khan and Louis W. Dane who was the Foreign Secretary of the Government of British India. It formalized the continuation of the Durand line as the official international border between Afghanistan and British India. The British Indian Government argued that the former diplomatic agreements made were personally for the previous ruler and needed to be renegotiated. The continued changing of Afghan foreign policy to British veto eventually fueled domestic resentment. This resentment along with Afghanistan wanting to maintain international sovereignty was one of the causes for the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919).

Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919): It was signed by Sir A. H. Grant, the secretary of Foreign Affairs in British India for Great Britain and Ali Ahmad Khan, the king of Afghanistan at the time, was established after the conclusion of the Third Anglo Afghan war in the same year. A ceasefire was announced after the war which was followed with negotiations between Afghanistan and the British at the Rawalpindi Peace Conference. The Treaty was an official reaffirmation of the border as the political boundary separating Afghanistan and British India, forcing Afghanistan to stop interfering with the Pashtun tribes present on the opposite side of the border along with in arms imports with British India and in return, Afghanistan received independence from the British as a sovereign state.

Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1921): This Treaty officialized the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan in foreign affairs. The Treaty of Rawalpindi was an incomplete document that mainly served as an agreement between both nations to end active fighting. Britain officially recognized Afghanistan as a state and national peer in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. The Treaty also acted as a permanent neighborly relations friendship treaty. Britain was willing to recognize Afghanistan as independent but aimed to limit the influence of the Soviet Union by forming an alliance, Afghanistan was willing to conclude the alliance with Britain if they could support the liberation of Bokhara and Khiva from Soviet control, but after three months of unsuccessful negotiations, both parties were unable to come to an agreement and required four stages of negotiations starting from January 10th, 1921 in Kabul.

Afghanistan-India Treaty of Friendship (1950): This treaty formally established everlasting peace between both countries after India's independence in 1947. The treaty was signed in New Delhi by India's Prime Minister at the time, Jawaharlal Nehru and Afghanistan's ambassador to India, Mohammad Najibullah. It initiated bilateral relations between both states with mutual respect for each country's sovereignty along with economic cooperation for development. The two Governments agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice Consuls and Consular Agents, who would reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's territory that both parties agreed to.

Geneva Accords (1988): They were a series of agreements signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan which was brokered by the United Nations and included the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors. It was designed to end the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), including a timetable for Soviet troops to withdraw according to the timetable with the safe return of deported refugees and ensured that Pakistan and Afghanistan would refrain from intervening in each other's internal affairs and would stop supporting militant factions against the other state.

Sararogha Peace Agreement (2005): An agreement negotiated by the Pakistani government and the Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud also known as the Doha Truce, mainly consisted of a committee of tribes and tribal Jirga accepting the terms of the government. The treaty was negotiated by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, a 21-member tribal Jirga from the Mehsud tribe and the Taliban. The negotiation was to stop attacks and amnesty in exchange for the Taliban not allowing foreign fighters along with not attacking state officials and institutions. The agreement fell apart soon after it was signed due to the Taliban administration refusing to write an official agreement and only offering verbal agreements which Pakistan refused. Instead of ensuring permanent peace, it gave the Taliban a political platform to unite with the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP)

Afghan-Pak Joint Peace Jirga (2007): An assembly held in Kabul that incorporated 700 ethnic tribal elders, politicians, religious scholars, and civil society leaders from both nations. The aim was to ease severe border tensions and create a common plan to confront Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The initiative was initially proposed in 2006 during a trilateral meeting in Washington between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States but was executed from August 9 to 12, 2007. The event was opened by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The outcome of the assembly was a Joint Declaration adopted by Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga which formally condemned terrorism and promised cooperation in rooting out training grounds. Despite the Joint Peace Jirga created, the assembly was considered unhelpful by some tribal factions, which stated that there would be no change without Taliban representation.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (2010): A pact signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan that allows Afghanistan which is a landlocked state, to access Pakistani seaports and Indian land borders. It was created to replace the outdated 1965 Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA), the pact allows Afghan exports to reach India through the Wagah land border and allows Afghan trucks to transport goods to designated Pakistani ports. Despite being enacted in June 2011, the agreement's implementation regularly encounters difficulties due to geopolitical tensions and policy differences between the two nations which leads to periodic renegotiations.

Doha Agreement (2020): Officially known as the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, is a peace treaty signed by Qatar, the United States, and the Taliban. It was signed by Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the political leader of the Taliban. The U.S. and its NATO allies agreed to withdraw all military forces from Afghanistan in 14 months if the Taliban met the commitments negotiated. The Taliban promised to prevent al-Qaeda and other extremist groups from using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies. The aim of the treaty was to reach a permanent ceasefire throughout Afghanistan. The United States and international observers reported that the Taliban failed to uphold the commitments negotiated, the Taliban also stated the U.S. also failed to uphold their commitments, causing the treaty to reach a null end point.

Bloc Positions

Afghanistan

Afghanistan views the Durand Line as an imaginary border that divides the Pashtun and Baloch tribes instead of an official international border. Afghanistan has frequently emphasized the effect the border has on the Pashtun communities and have expressed concerns about how the instability of the line affects nationalists, adds friction to trades, and hinders development.

Subsequently, Afghanistan will prioritize development, the assistance of affected refugees, and regional cooperation. It may support counterterrorism efforts but would disapprove of any measures affecting its sovereignty and actions that would negatively affect regional communities.

Pakistan

Pakistan views the Durand Line as its official international border and recognizes border insecurity as a major national security issue. Islamabad acts on threats posed by militant organizations on the border and blocks illegal trade networks including counterterrorism operations against militant networks affecting the border

Subsequently, Pakistan aims to support and advocate for stronger border controls, counterterrorism initiatives, and recognition of the Durand line as an official border. It may also emphasize the difficulty of providing for Afghan refugees and request the assistance of international support in addressing regional security along with disapproval on any counterterrorism measures.

Western Counterterrorism Powers: United States, United Kingdom, France

The United States of America , the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic frequently align on security issues regarding the Durand Line with each country stating concerns for the overall stability of the border. The United States has been frequently involved in military, diplomatic, and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan since 2001. France has not participated in any actions directly affecting the Durand Line and the United Kingdom's actions for the Durand line have primarily been historical. All three permanent members view the border as a legal international border obtained by the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.

Future actions the United States, the United Kingdom and France are willing to take regarding the strengthening of counterterrorism operations against militant groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State Khorasan Province. The states would also support actions for humanitarian assistance, strengthening missions, and overall border security. They will object to any proposals overriding current UNSC sanctions or fail to provide practical solutions for refugee safety.

Sovereignty and Regional Stability: China, Syria, Iran, Russia.

The Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, and the Syrian Arab Republic share similar principles regarding sovereignty and regional stability. All four countries have consistently argued that states should have the primary responsibility of managing their internal affairs and would not support the external involvement of countries in the domestic conflicts regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Consequently, they will support resolutions supporting the economic development of the region, cooperation between both states for security improvement, and measures that do not require international interference. They will object to any resolutions disregarding the sovereignty of either state, and political settlements that could have negative long term affect to the region.

Regional Security and Development: India, Türkiye, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka.

The Republic of India, Republic of Türkiye, People's Republic of Bangladesh, and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka all display concerns for the overall security in the region due to counterterrorism threats supported by regional and international countries. These countries will support resolutions or actions strengthening regional security cooperation between both states along the border to prevent further aggravation and will support internal economic development specially for Afghanistan to prevent weak internal structures from being exploited by militant groups.

Subsequently, they will object to any reforms supporting the escalation of military conflict that could endanger regionalists and weaken infrastructure along with any policies that weaken economic trade which could weaken economic integration.

Human Rights and Sustainable Development goals: Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Iraq, Bahrain.

All five countries have experienced or are currently experiencing humanitarian conflicts that include weakened public services, displacement, and violence. Due to their previous or current experiences, these countries have strong views on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and humanitarian assistance. They will support measures that aim to prevent further conflict, enhance infrastructure, and assist affected individuals. They will object to resolutions with a lack of or weak international support or any solutions that are unsustainable long term.

Past Resolutions

RESOLUTION	CONTENT OF RESOLUTION
RESOLUTION 622 UNSC	Confirmed the Geneva Accords of 1988 between Afghanistan and Pakistan on non-interference and non-intervention, and authorised UNGOMAP to monitor compliance along the Durand Line.
RESOLUTION 647 UNSC	Extended UNGOMAP's mandate to continue monitoring the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the implementation of the Geneva Accords.
RESOLUTION 1076 UNSC	Called on all parties in Afghanistan to stop fighting and denounced cross-border interference and external supply of arms to any Afghan faction
RESOLUTION 1193 UNSC	Declared the Afghan conflict a growing threat to regional and international peace and security and demanded all states refrain from outside interference.
RESOLUTION 1214 UNSC	Demanded that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary to international terrorists and called on all states to halt the cross-border supply of arms.
RESOLUTION 1267 UNSC	Established the Taliban–Al-Qaida sanctions regime; cited in legal scholarship as the resolution treating the Durand Line as the de jure international border to which the principle of non-intervention applies.

• RESOLUTION 1333 UNSC	Strengthened sanctions on the Taliban and imposed an arms embargo targeting cross-border weapons flows into Afghanistan.
• RESOLUTION 1363 UNSC	Established the Monitoring Group and Sanctions Enforcement Support Team to police the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for sanctions evasion.
• RESOLUTION 1373 UNSC	Imposed binding counter-terrorism obligations on all member states to deny safe haven, control borders and prevent the cross-border movement of terrorists; relied upon by Pakistan as the legal basis for fencing the Durand Line.
• RESOLUTION 1378 UNSC	Supported the establishment of a new transitional Afghan government and reaffirmed Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• RESOLUTION 1383 UNSC	Endorsed the Bonn Agreement on provisional arrangements for Afghanistan.
• RESOLUTION 1386 UNSC	Authorised the establishment of ISAF to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security.
• RESOLUTION 1390 UNSC	Broadened the Taliban–Al-Qaida sanctions regime, extending the travel ban and arms embargo across borders.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

1. What are the measures for circumvention of state granted asylum to non state actor groups which the UN can undertake?
2. How can the UN disrupt and oppose the funding of non state entities by state and otherwise?
3. To what extent is it feasible to establish UN peacekeeping operations to restore sanctity in areas impacted by non state actors?
4. To what extent is it feasible to establish UN peacekeeping operations to restore sanctity in areas which have previously, or continue to, harbour non state actor groups?
5. How can the UN help rebuild areas worse affected by non state entities' actions?
6. How can humanitarian aid be delivered without empowering non state actor groups?
7. How can the UN facilitate multilateral efforts to suppress and eradicate non state actor groups?
8. What measures can be taken to prevent recruitment and radicalisation of the populace in LEDCs and other states prone to radicalism?
9. How can the UNSC ensure accountability and counter non compliance from non state actor groups ?
10. How can the international community navigate counter terrorism efforts when the asylum granting states are either unwilling or militarily unable to support these efforts?
11. How can the UN protect nations incapable of indigenous defence from non state actors?
12. What measures can the UN take to discourage states from protecting and supporting non state actor groups?

Sources to Use

SOURCES TO USE

1. Website that end with .org, or .edu
2. Official government websites (Of your portfolio)
3. Websites that have been ratified by the UN: Amnesty International, Aljazeera, BBC, Britannica etc.
4. Websites of NGOs your portfolio is associated with
5. Official UN websites: UNCTAD, WTO, etc.

These sources should be utilised by delegates since they hold accurate information which gives delegates deeper insight to the delegate

SOURCES NOT TO USE

1. OP-ed articles
2. Websites that end with .com, since they may have vested interests.
3. Buzzfeed
4. Quora
5. Wikipedia

These sources should not be used as they are written at the discretion of the writer's interpretation and opinion which may mislead the delegate.

Preambulatory and Operative Clauses

Preambulatory clauses:

Acknowledging Affirming Alarmed by Approving Aware of Believing Bearing in mind Confident Congratulating Contemplating Convinced Declaring Deeply concerned Deeply conscious Deeply convinced Deeply disturbed Deeply regretting Deploing Desiring Emphasizing Expecting Expressing its appreciation Expressing its satisfaction	Fulfilling Fully alarmed Fulfilling Fully alarmed Fully aware Fully believing Further deploring Further recalling Guided by Having adopted Having considered Having considered further Having devoted attention Having examined Having heard Having received Having studied Keeping in mind Noting further.	Taking note Viewing with appreciation Welcoming Noting with appreciation Noting with approval Noting with deep concern Noting with regret Noting with satisfaction Observing Pointing out Reaffirming Realizing Recalling Recognizing Referring Reminding Seeking Taking into account Taking into consideration
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Preambulatory and Operative Clauses

Operative clauses:

Accepts	Designates	Recommends
Affirms	Encourages	Regrets
Approves	Endorses	Requests
Appreciates	Expresses its hope	Resolves
Asks	Further invites	Seeks
Authorizes	Further proclaims	Strongly affirms
Calls for	Further recommends	Strongly condemns
Calls upon	Further requests	Strongly urges
Condemns	Further resolves	Suggests
Congratulates	Hopes	Trusts
Confirms	Proclaims	Transmits
Deplores	Proposes	Urges